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DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE INFORMANTS, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE NEED FOR
PRIOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
INTRODucTION

Recently, the use of informants and undercover agents' by the
government for domestic intelligence gathering has received much
public attention. Simultaneous investigations by the Senate 2 and
House8 Select Committees on Intelligence have rekindled the controversy which inevitably accompanies a conflict between the legitimate
interests of government in enforcing its laws and the constitutional
rights which are endemic to American democracy.
The purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate the need for prior
judicial review of the decision by law enforcement agencies to use informants. The reluctance of the Supreme Court to recognize the fourth
and fifth amendment interests at stake has prevented the development
of effective legal safeguards against the dangers of illegitimate official
use of informants for intelligence gathering. This, in turn, has fostered abuses which seriously inhibit the exercise of first amendment
freedoms. Although the scope of the protection available under the
1. For purposes of this Comment, the terms "informant," "undercover agent,"
and "secret agent" refer to individuals who surreptitiously gather information or
conduct other covert intelligence activities upon the orders of a law enforcement
agency. The terms will be used interchangeably throughout the Comment, but, unless
otherwise specified, they do not apply to individuals who gather information on their
own initiative or for private concerns or whose assistance is neither solicited by, nor
within the control of, a law enforcement agency.
The type of informant discussed in this Comment is usually recruited and compensated by a law enforcement agency and acts as its employee. The constitutional
implications of the use of this type of official agent, as well as the implications for a
democratic society in general, are far greater than those presented by the private use
of undercover operatives. The design of the constitution "to keep government off the
backs of the people," Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 28 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting),
and consequent restrictions on state action require more zealous scrutiny of governmental than of strictly private use of secret agents. Private intelligence gathering is
often conducted merely for the purpose of protecting an employer against pilferage or
other activities detrimental to his business.
Various forms of electronic surveillance are not within the scope of this Comment.
Unlike the "unbugged" informant, electronic surveillance is regulated by federal statutes,
which impose a requirement of a warrant based upon probable cause. Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. III, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1970 & Supp.
1975). The Supreme Court has distinguished electronic from non-electronic surveillance
with respect to constitutional requirements. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
2. Hereinafter referred to as the Senate Committee.
3. Hereinafter referred to as the House Committee.
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first amendment has not been clearly articulated by the Supreme Court,
the first amendment offers the only viable basis for challenging widespread official spying. More important, the first amendment provides
a basis for a judicially or legislatively created requirement of prior judicial review of the use of informants by law enforcement agencies.
As this article demonstrates, only such a measure will adequately safeguard first amendment interests while permitting law enforcement
agencies to employ informants when necessary.
I. THE

STATUS OF INFORMANTS UNDER PRESENT LAW:
THE LACK OF ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS

The use of informants is overwhelmingly the most common
method of domestic intelligence gathering employed by law enforcement agencies. 4 Generally, officials justify this technique as a highly
effective and necessary means by which they can gather information in order to prevent crimes and public disorders.5 Law enforcement agencies view the broad authority to utilize informants as indispensable if they are to keep pace with potential unlawful activity,
particularly because of the subtle complexity of much modem "antisocial" behavior. 6
4. Informants are the primary source of information in approximately 85 percent
of intelligence investigations conducted by the FBI, as compared with 5 percent in
which the primary source is electronic surveillance. As of June 30, 1975, the FBI had
1,500 domestic informants in its employ, not including those informants used strictly
in connection with the investigation of particular crimes. The budget allocation for
fiscal year 1976 for the FBI's intelligence informant program was $7,401,000. SENATE
SELECT COMMss.

TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL

OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLI-

GENCE AcTIvrrIEs, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE AcTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 228

(1976)

[hereinafter cited as SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT].

5. Intelligence gathering has been described as "proactive," rather than "reactive,"
police work. Statement of the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners, The Public
Disorder Intelligence Function of the Los Angeles Police Department at 1 (April 10,
1975).
By analyzing past actions and keeping abreast of present activities, reasonable
projections can be made which may permit the police to anticipate the commission of a crime and take steps to prevent it.
Id. at 2. See also Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970):
The police function is pervasive. It is not limited to the detection of past
criminal events. Of at least equal importance is the responsibility to prevent
crime ....
Mhe preventive role requires an awareness of group tensions and
preparations to head off disasters as well as to deal with them if they appear.
To that end the police must know what forces exist, what groups or organizations could be enmeshed in public disorders.
56 N.J. at 222, 265 A.2d at 684 (citations omitted).
6. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 311-12 (1972);
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Nevertheless, good faith claims by a law enforcement agency
that infiltration by informants is a necessary tool for achieving legitimate government objectives cannot alone justify infiltration which is
constitutionally impermissible or otherwise illegal 7 Thus far, however,
the Supreme Court has declined to hold that the use of informants
is per se unconstitutional or that the decision to utilize informants
should be subject to prior judicial review. As a result, law enforcement agencies currently have virtually unlimited discretion in making
this decision.
A. The Rejection of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Protections
1. The fourth amendment. In holding that the covert use of in-

formants is not per se unconstitutional, the Supreme Court, in Hoffa
v. United States,8 stated that the fourth amendment does not protect
"a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." Based on this version of
the assumption of risk doctrine, the Court concluded that "no right
protected by the Fourth Amendment was violated" by the use of an
0
informant who had been taken into the petitioner's confidence.' The

Court therefore rejected the fourth amendment as a ground for suppressing evidence of conversations heard by the informant, although

he had been present without prior judicial approval.
In Katz v. United States," the Court discarded the physical trespass theory of the fourth amendment

2

and construed that amendment

Hearings on S. Res. 21 Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., vol. 6, at 132 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings] (testimony of
James Adams, Assistant to the Director, FBI, Dec. 2, 1975).
7.
[W]e must consider the two objects of desire, both of which we cannot have,
and make up our minds which to choose. It is desirable that criminals should
be detected, and to that end that all available evidence should be used. It
also is desirable that the government should not itself foster and pay for other
crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained ....
We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
8. 385 U.S. 293 (1966). Hoffa and his co-defendants were convicted of attempting to bribe members of a jury, primarily on the basis of the testimony of a paid informant who was able to gain Hoffa's confidence and overheard his conversations. Particularly damaging were conversations overheard between Hoifa and his attorney.
9. Id. at 302. See also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
10. 385 U.S. at 303.
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
12. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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as affording protection for conversations, in addition to tangible items,
where the participants are justified in relying on the privacy of their
communications. Thus, the exclusionary rule was applied to evidence
derived from an electronic listening device that enabled agents, who
had not obtained a warrant, to monitor defendant's conversations in
a telephone booth. Initially, there was some doubt as to whether the
interpretation of the fourth amendment enunciated in Hoffa with
respect to informants could continue to prevail in light of the Katz
doctrine. Any such doubt was apparently laid to rest in United States
v. White, 13 a post-Katz reaffirmance of Hoffa.14 The Court again held
that where the agent is a participant in the conversation or is known
to be present during the conversation-as was the case in Hoffa but
not in Katz-the defendant assumes the risk that his statements will
be revealed to the government.' 5 As a result, the use of informants
by law enforcement agencies continues to be considered outside the
purview of the fourth amendment and, therefore, not subject to any
warrant requirement or other sort of prior judicial review.' 6
2. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In
Hoffa, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was
held not to be violated-in the absence of coercive tactics or custodial
interrogation' 7 -when an informant elicits incriminating verbal evidence from a suspect.' 8
B. "Existing" Protections
1. The sixth amendment right to counsel. According to the Hoffa
Court, Coplon v. United States"9 and Caldwell v. United States20 were
two cases in which "[t]he proposition that a surreptitious invasion by
a government agent into the legal camp of the defense may violate the
protection of the Sixth Amendment has found expression ...."2.1In
Coplon, a violation of the attorney-client privilege of the sixth amend13. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
14. But see Bakes v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Il1. 1972), holding
that at least within the Seventh Circuit, White was to be construed as controlling only
pre-Katz interceptions of conversations.
15. 401 U.S. at 749.
16. For criticism of this doctrine, see Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agents, 76
YALE L.J. 994 (1967).
17. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304 (1966).
19. 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
20. 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
21. 385 U.S. at 306.
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ment was found where telephone conversations between the accused
and her attorney were intercepted by the government both prior to and
during her trial.22 The right of persons accused of a crime to consult
with counsel both before and during trial was held to be a
fundamental right which cannot be abridged, interfered with, or
impinged upon in any manner. The prosecution is not entitled to have
a representative present to hear the conversations of accused and
counsel.... [T]he Fifth and Sixth Amendments. .. unqualifiedly
guard the right to assistance of counsel, without making the vindicacation of the right23 depend upon whether its denial resulted in demonstrable prejudice.
That is, the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment is
violated by a mere invasion of the attorney-client relationship, regardless of the consequences of that invasion on the outcome of the trial.
In Caldwell, a government agent served as an assistant to the defense, thereby gaining free access to the planning of defense strategy
and other matters related to the impending trial. 24 The court of appeals found the placing of the informant into the defense camp violative of the attorney-client privilege, reinforcing the concept that the
mere presence of a government agent is prohibited by the sixth amendment.
In Hoffa, however, the Court rejected the notion of an absolute
attorney-client privilege both before and during trial, limiting the
Coplon and Caldwell cases to their facts 2 4-1 The mere utilization by the
government of an informant to overhear conversations between a suspect and his attorney would no longer be sufficient grounds to claim
a sixth amendment violation. Henceforth, a defendant would have to
show that the conversations were directly related to a charge for which
the suspect had been arrested and was facing trial at the time the
comments were overheard.2 5 This would be true even if the defendant
could show that the police intentionally delayed making an arrest, a
stage at which a suspect cannot be interrogated unless provided with
an opportunity to confer privately with counsel.
22. 191 F.2d at 759.
23. Id. (emphasis added).

24. 205 F.2d at 759.
24.1 Later, in Weatherford v. Bursey, 45 U.S.L.W. 4154 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977),
the Court noted that it had, in Hoffa, "merely assumed, without deciding," that Coplon
and Caldwell were decided correctly. Id. at 4156.
25. 385 U.S. at 307-08. Only rarely does an intelligence investigation result in a

criminal prosecution.

SENATE

COMMITTEE REPORT

at 231.
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On the basis of this view of the attorney-client privilege, courts
began to chip away at Coplon and Caldwell. One federal court held,
in language that appears to be contrary to that of Coplon,26 that
"[m]ere presence of an informant during strategy sessions of defense attorneys is not per se violative of the right to freely communicate with counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." 27 In addition,
in Kirby v. Illinois,28 the Supreme Court held that the accused's sixth
amendment "right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that
2
adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him."
Recently, the Supreme Court dealt the final blow to the CoplonCaldwell notion of per se violation of the sixth amendment. In
Weatherford v. Bursey, 29"1 defendant and an undercover agent were
arrested for vandalizing a selective service office. Thereafter, in order
to preserve the effectiveness of his cover, the agent continued to masquerade as a co-defendant. The guise was successful; defendant and
his attorney unsuspectingly invited the informant to participate in
conversations at which defense strategy was planned. 20 .2 Subsequently,
the agent testified at trial but did not directly reveal information
obtained at the strategy sessions. The Court, reversing the decision
below,29.3 found no unconstitutional invasion of the attorney-client
privilege:
[When conversations with counsel have been overheard, the constitutionality of the conviction depends on whether the overheard
conversations have produced, directly or indirectly, any of the evidence offered at trial. This is a far cry from the per se rule an-

26. See text accompanying note 23 supra.

27. United States v. Crow Dog, 399 F. Supp. 228, 237 (N.D. Iowa 1975). Coplon
and Caldwell were distinguished here as involving "gross intrusion[s]," id., following
the characterization of those cases adopted by the Hoffa Court. See 385 U.S. at 306.
See also United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1973) (no sixth
amendment violation where co-indictees who were present during conversations between
defendant and defendant's attorney were asked by the government to cooperate against
defendant but had not agreed to do so); United States v. Zarzour, 432 F.2d 1 (5th
Cir. 1970) (where FBI informant served as private investigator for defendant's attorney, participated in the development of defendant's trial strategy, attended conferences
between defendant and his attorneys, and sat with counsel at trial, case remanded for
in camera inspection of FBI files to determine the nature of the information communicated to the FBI or the prosecution and its relevance to defendant).
28. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
29. Id. at 688. See also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
29.1 45 U.S.L.W. 4154 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977).
29.2 The Court intimated that it might have viewed defendant's claims more
sympathetically had he not invited the informant to participate. Id. at 4157.
29.3 Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1975).
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nounced by the Court of Appeals below, for under that rule trial
prejudice to the defendant is deemed irrelevant.2 9-4
Defendant's case, the Court indicated, would have been stronger had
the agent testified as to the actual conversations, had the government's
evidence been derived from these conversations, had the agent's presence during the conversations resulted in some other way to defendant's "substantial prejudice," or had there been evidence that details of the conversations about trial preparation were forwarded to
2 5
the prosecution. 9Thus, in the vast majority of domestic intelligence-gathering investigations, the use of informants to obtain information about matters
within the attorney-client relationship is not subject to sixth amendment restrictions. Since surveillance of this type almost always occurs
well in advance of the commencement of formal proceedings and often
is unrelated to any specific criminal activity, law enforcement agencies
have wide discretion in utilizing informants to learn about matters
within the attorney-client relationship. Only when formal proceedings
have been commenced, when there is more than mere presence of the
informant within the confines of the defense camp, and when the
information reported to the government by the informant relates to
the specific charge for which an accused is to be tried are courts obligated by sixth amendment doctrine to find a violation of the right to
counsel.
29.4 45 U.S.L.W. at 4156.
29.5 Id. at 4156. Justice Marshall delivered a strongly worded dissent in which
Justice Brennan joined. Finding the rule established by the majority as "little better
than no rule at all," id., at 4159, Justice Marshall reasoned:
Establishing that a desire to intercept confidential communications was a
factor in a State's decision to keep an agent under cover will seldom be possible, since the State always can argue plausibly that its sole purpose was to
continue to enjoy the legitimate services of the undercover agent. Proving that
an informer reported to the prosecution on defense strategy will be equally
difficult, not only because such proof requires an informer or prosecutor to
admit his own wrongdoing (and open the door to damage suits and attacks on
convictions), but also because an informer's failure to make a report after
overhearing a lawyer-client session oftentimes can be an effective means of
communicating to the prosecutor that nothing was uncovered. Given these
problems of proof, the only way to assure that defendants will feel free to
communicate candidly with their lawyers is to prohibit the government from
intercepting such confidential communications, at least absent a compelling
justification for doing so.
Like the Court of Appeals, and unlike the majority today, I believe
a per se rule of this sort is fully supported.
Id. at 4159-60.
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2. Entrapment. Entrapment is an affirmative defense to be used
at trial.30 It is available to the criminal defendant whose offense would
not have been committed but for the fact that a police agent "implant[ed] in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit
the alleged offense and induce[d] its commission" so that the defendant
3
could be prosecuted. 1

The entrapment concept offers little protection to the subject of
an intelligence-gathering operation: it is not available unless the defendant has been arrested and will be tried. Absent arrest and trial,
which are extremely rare in domestic intelligence cases, entrapment
has never taken place: courts have not recognized a constitutional right
to be free of entrapment that does not result in arrest and prosecution.
Moreover, even where the defendant has been brought to trial, the
subjective test used by the federal courts is difficult to meet. 2
3. The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
are violated by police practices which "offend the community's sense
of fair play and decency" 3 or are "so outrageous ... [that they violate]
that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice,' "4 or are contrary to the "decencies of civilized conduct." 85 Unfortunately, these standards are nebulous. 36 While the Supreme Court
has maintained continually that due process remains as a barrier to
certain police activities, it has been reluctant to invoke the standarda 7
30. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1968).
31. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932). See also Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
32. See, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1646 (1976); United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
33. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
34. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (quoting Kinsella v.
United States ex reL Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)).
35. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952). See also United States v.
DeSapio, 435 F.2d 272, 282 (2d Cir. 1970).
36. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952): "Due process of law, as a
historic and generative principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about
by methods that offend a 'sense of justice.'" Id. at 173.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (no due process violation where conviction obtained for unlawful manufacturing and sale of an illegal drug
even though a police agent supplied defendants with an indispensable ingredient for
the drug's manufacture that was very difficult to obtain); Neils v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188, 199 (1972) (unnecessary suggestiveness of pretrial identification held not violative of due process if "under the 'totality of the circumstances' the identification was
reliable"). Compare Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969) (due process violation
where robbery victim failed to identify defendant in one suggestive lineup, made only
a tentative identification at a one-on-one showup, and finally identified defendant in
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Indeed, no court has found the activities of an informant to be unconstitutional on due process grounds. Although it is possible that an
informant's activities might someday be held violative of the principles

of due process, there is no indication that such a holding is imminent.
4. Supervisory powers. While a federal court may overturn state

convictions only through application of the fourteenth amendment, it
may go beyond minimal constitutional requirements in its supervisory
administration of the federal criminal justice system.3 8 In United
States v. Banks, 9 a federal court utilized its supervisory powers to dismiss a case on the ground that the defendant could not receive a fair
trial because of government misconduct. In enunciating the test which
would trigger the use of supervisory powers, the court stated that:
The attorneys' and enforcement officers' conduct need not be so unfair or imprudent as to offend "due process" before exercise of this
supervisory power is appropriate ....
Instead the supervisory power
can be utilized whenever the administrationof justice is tainted.... 40

Although this test appears to be easier to satisfy than that of the
due process clause, it undoubtedly would be necessary to prove a high

degree of misconduct by an informant before a court could be prompted
to invoke its supervisory powers, particularly where the informant's behavior is the only ground upon which a request for use of these powers
rests. 41 Moreover, to rely on the protection of the court's supervisory
another lineup, at which defendant was the only person to reappear from the first lineup); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (due process violation where an emetic
solution was forced through a tube into defendanes stomach against his will in order
to induce vomiting so that officers could recover narcotic capsules defendant had swallowed).
38. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943).
39. 383 F. Supp. 389 (W.D.S.D. 1974).
40. Id. at 392 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in Hoffa, maintained that the Court should have used its supervisory powers because of the "affront
to the quality and fairness of federal law enforcement" presented there by the type
of informant used and the nature of his activities, which had "a serious potential for
undermining the integrity of the truth-finding process in the federal courts." 385 U.S.
at 320.
41. The Banks court was faced with repeated instances of misconduct by the government in its handling of the case, which arose out of the Indian occupation of
Wounded Knee, South Dakota. Despite warnings that the court would not tolerate such
misconduct, the government persisted in conspiring to suborn perjury, suppressing an FBI
statement exposing the perjury of a government witness, illegal and unconstitutional
use of military personnel and equipment at Wounded Knee and an effort to cover it up,
violations of ethical, professional and moral standards, and various other examples of misconduct. 383 F. Supp. at 391. See also United States v. Crow Dog, 399 F. Supp. 228
(N.D. Iowa 1975) ; N.Y. Times, March 13, 1975, at 31, col. 1.
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powers is to rely on such unpredictable factors as the discretion and
subjective judgment of the court.4
These four available "protections" against the use of informants
for intelligence-gathering purposes-the sixth amendment, the defense
of entrapment, the due process clause, and the supervisory powers of
the federal courts-do not deal effectively with the most serious aspect
of the problem: the generally unchecked discretion enjoyed by law enforcement agencies in determining when, how, and against whom an
informant will be utilized. This absence of constitutional or statutory
controls over law enforcement agencies permits continuing invasions of
privacy and the inhibition of constitutionally protected activity. The
following cases illustrate the extent to which the use of informants for
intelligence gathering has been abused and the need for effective controls.
II. THE CONTEMPORARY USE OF INFORMANTS FOR DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE: LIMrrLESS BOUNDARIES AND

WIDESPREAD ABUSE

In 1973 and 1974, Mary Jo Cook was a paid informant for the
FBI. Cook was ordered to infiltrate a local chapter of the Vietnam
Veterans Against the War (VVAW), an organization the FBI suspected of having a potential for violence. In testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Cook described her duties as follows:
I was to go to meetings, write up reports or phone in reports on
what happened, who was there, in some way to try to totally identify
the background of every person there, what their relationships were,
who they were living with, who they were sleeping with, to try to
get some sense of the local structure and the local relationships
among the people in the organization.
So I'd go to a meeting, identify the people who were present
and identify them
as individuals, and then identify the substance
43
of the meeting.
Cook's instructions to delve into the personal lives of the members
of the group she infiltrated were not unusual. Another witness before
the Senate Intelligence Committee, Gary T. Rowe, had infiltrated the
42. See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
43. Senate Hearings at 111.
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Klu Klux Klan for the FBI in the Birmingham, Alabama, area from
1960 to 1965. He testified that he was to report not only political
information, but also "the most intimate details" of Klan members'
social and personal lives. 44 Rowe was instructed to attempt to break
up the homes of as many Klan members as possible by sleeping with
their wives. 45

An informant named Robert Merritt, who testified

before the House Intelligence Committee, had been instructed by the
FBI during the early 1970's to "solicit and provide information to the

FBI regarding homosexual proclivities of politically prominent people

46
and individuals of the New Left."
The government's need for information of this kind is not readily
apparent. The use of undercover police agents to provide official
agencies with the details of the sex lives of whole groups of people is
4
neither consistent with the most basic view of the right to privacy, 7

nor easily justified as necessary to prevent violence 8 or to preserve the
national security. 49

Yet, even in the absence of the most tenuous con-

nections between the information sought and specific criminal activity,
the scope of information which an informant may surreptitiously obtain
is virtually unlimited. 50
44. Id. at 116.
45. Id. at 118.
46. See HousE SELECT CoMMas. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMM. REPORT, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1916), reprinted in Village Voice, Feb. 16, 1976, at 91, col. 1 thereinafter cited
as HOUSE ComIMrTTE

REPORT in Village Voice]. (On Jan. 29, 1976, the House of

Representatives voted not to release the Committee Report until the executive branch
had had an opportunity to censor it for purposes of national security. 122 CONG. REc.
H514 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1976). The Village Voice, however, has published excerpts
of the Report. Therefore, all citations to the contents of the Report will refer to the
portions that appeared in the Village Voice.)
47. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
48. See, e.g., Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 510 F.2d 253, 254 (2d
Cir. 1974); Statement of the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners, supra note 5.
49. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 311-1.2
(1972); Senate Hearings at 132 (testimony of James Adams, Assistant to the Director,

FBI, Dec. 2, 1975).
50. Witnesses at the Senate Hearings amply testified to the lack of any limits on
the scope of their investigations: "There were no guidelines as to what information
was important or wasn't important. My financial arrangement with [the FBI] was ...
that I would turn over all information gathered. . . . They didn't define my context ... ." Senate Hearings at 112 (testimony of Mary Jo Cook, FBI informant, Dec.

2, 1975).
MR. Sc waRz: What kind of information did you report back to the FBI about
the Klan?
MIR. RowE: Any and everything that I observed or heard pertaining to any Klans'man.

Id. at 116 (testimony of Gary T. Rowe, FBI informant, Dec. 2, 1975).
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The implications of this lack of control often are more serious
than the invasions of privacy discussed above. In order to infiltrate
an organization effectively or to serve as an effective agent provocateur,51 the informant may either participate in or encourage illegal
activities by organization members.5 2 In order to secure the confidence
of members of the group, he may cultivate a reputation of being
"game," to show "[t]hat [he] would not just say something, [he] would
go through with it.... ',53 The results can be brutal. One informant
testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that he participated
with Klan members in beating people with chains at a county fair 4
and beating the Birmingham Freedom Riders.55 Another FBI informant testified that, pursuant to FBI instructions, he infiltrated a
peaceful anti-war group in Camden, New Jersey,"0 and instigated a
burglary at a Camden draft board. The tools, money, and technical
assistance with which members of the group were supplied were all
provided or financed by the FBI. 7 When the agent began to believe
that this activity had escalated to the level of a conspiracy, he tried to
call off the burglary, but was instructed by his FBI superiors to carry
it out.58 In San Diego, California, an informant utilized by the FBI
from 1967 through 1972 to infiltrate a right-wing paramilitary group
became involved in such things as "firebombing, smashing windows,
placing stickers bearing the group's symbols on cars and buildings,
propelling lug nuts through windows with sling shots, and breaking
and entering." 59
That illegal methods are used is not suprising in view of the type
of person usually recruited to be an informant. According to James
Adams, Assistant to the Director of the FBI, "the informants you
develop are not recruited from Sunday Schools." 0 0 Most informants
51. Although there is often no more than a fine line between illegal entrapment

and the activities of an agent provocateur, it is generally held that no entrapment
exists where government agents "merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense." Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932).
52. See SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT at 231.
53. People v. Collier, 85 Misc. 2d 529, 539, 376 N.Y.S.2d 954, 966 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1975).
54. Senate Hearings at 117 (testimony of Gary T. Rowe, FBI informant, Dec. 2,
1975).
55. Id. at 118.
56. HousE COMMITTEE REPORT in Village Voice at 92, col. 1, n.540.
57. Id. at 92, col. 1, n.541.
58. Id. at 91, col. 1.
59. SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT at 267-70.
60. HousE ComMITTEE REPORT in Village Voice at 91, cols. 1-2.
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recruited from outside the law enforcement agency have had experience in dealing with criminal elements. They are generally compensated with cash, the amount often depending on how incriminating
the information which they furnish is. 61 Since the more incriminating
the information, the more money the informant receives, an informant
of already dubious character has an incentive to do his utmost to discover, encourage, or even create criminal activity.
Infiltration of the defense camp of a criminal defendant is another
abusive tactic attributable to the absence of controls over the use of
informants.6 2 In addition to her duties as an infiltrator of the VVAW,
Cook insists that she also infiltrated the defense camphof defendants
in the trials stemming from the Attica, New York, prison rebellion
of 1971, in order to report to the FBI details of the defendants' legal
strategy.6 3 Douglass Durham, who was the chief aide and confidante
of Dennis Banks, co-leader of the American Indian Movement, served
as an informant for the FBI during Banks' trial on federal charges
in connection with the occupation of Wounded Knee, South Dakota. 64
Although the recent testimony before the congressional investigating committees has been confined largely to federal intelligence
agencies, abuses by informants are widespread among local police
forces as well. People v. Collier65 is a case in point. There, an undercover agent named Alvarez, assigned to New York City's Bureau of
Special Services (BOSS), 66 covertly gathered intelligence and prepared
daily reports of what he heard and observed throughout the Lower
East Side community of New York from May 1971 through July 1973.
In the course of his operations, Alvarez met the defendant, who,
despite a prior criminal record, had become well-known for his deep
61. Id. at 91, col. 2. Statutory authorization for the payment of informants by
the Justice Department is found in 28 U.S.C. § 524 (1966).

62. See text accompanying notes 19-29 supra.
63. N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
64. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1975, at 31, col. 1.
65. 85 Misc. 2d 529, 376 N.Y.S.2d 954 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).

66.
BOSS was formed in October 1912 ....
[Ilts function remain[s] the sameto investigate and control trouble-making subversives, whoever they happen to
be....
. . . The Bureau was remarkably successful in infiltrating radical groups

on the left and on the right throughout the decade, and it was especially
good at putting police agents into the myriad black groups that blossomed in
the city.
ZIMROTH,
PANTHER

960.
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21, 47-48 (1974), quoted in Collier, 85 Misc. 2d at 532-33, 376 N.Y.S.2d at
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involvement in community affairs. He became the focus of the
operation for "[n]o articulable, credible reasons," and certainly not
because he was suspected of any criminal activity.0 7 Alvarez became
defendant's constant companion and kept voluminous records of defendant's associates and his conversations and dealings with them. As
the court noted, "[Alvarez] reported to BOSS officials, seemingly, each
and every movement by defendant during the two year infiltration .... ,,68
The extent and pervasiveness of activities of this kind are compelling evidence of the need for more effective controls on the use of
informants for official intelligence gathering. These activities are
inimical to the first amendment guarantees of free and uninhibited
expression of ideas and unrestrained freedom to associate.09 It is from
this point of view that the relationship between first amendment adjudication and the use of informants to gather intelligence will be
examined.

III.

THE USE OF INFORMANTS AND THE FimR

AMENDMENT:

How CHILLING MUST THE EFFECr BE?

A. Laird v. Tatum
In opening the session of the Senate Hearings on the FBI's use of
informants, Senator Tower observed:
When an informant is used to penetrate an organization to provide
intelligence information, the possible impact of... his influence on
that organization ... cannot be ignored. Surely, the infiltration of

67. 85 Misc. 2d at 538-39, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 964-65.
68. Id. at 542, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
69.
Intimate human relationships depend largely on the sense that the participants
are free from the observation of others, and that sense is essential to the development of individual points of view and modes of life. Continuing contacts
with those looking for damaging information are both highly unpleasant and
deeply disturbing to any sense of security. Moreover, the more wide-sweeping
the power to gather evidence, the greater the danger that the power will be
arbitrarily used to harass those "out of favor" or those against whom particular officials have personal grievances; the greater also the danger that information obtained will fall into inappropriate hands or be misused.
Greenvalt, The Right to Privacy, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 300 (N. Dorsen ed.
1971).
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informants into groups and organizations Who seek to bring about
political, socio-economic, or other changes in our society represents,
at the very least, a chilling effect upon the freedom of citizens to
gather and to debate and to work for such change.70
The term "chilling effect" is used in first amendment adjudication to denote an inhibition, as opposed to a direct prohibition, of the
full exercise of first amendment freedoms caused by the threat of
some governmental action. 71 Chilling effects have been held to emanate from threats of governmental sanction, 72 of interference with
the right to pursue a particular profession or employment, 7 and of
exposure of private associational activities. 74
Since "[t]he threat of sanctions may deter .
almost as potently
as the actual application of sanctions,"75 traditional rules of standing
and ripeness have frequently been modified by the Supreme Court in
order to accommodate claims of a chilling effect. 76 For instance,
where an allegedly overbroad regulatory statute is claimed to chill

protected expression, attacks on the statute have been permitted even
though the attacker has not demonstrated that his own conduct could
not be constitutionally regulated by a more narrowly drawn statute?7
One need not violate a statute and risk criminal prosecution in order
to be procedurally able to challenge it as inhibiting protected expression, particularly since the risk of prosecution itself may constitute a
chilling effect. 78 The Court has "molded both substantive rights and
procedural remedies in the face of varied conflicting interests to conform to [its] overriding duty to insulate all individuals from the
'chilling effect' upon exercise of First Amendment freedoms generated
70. Senate Hearings at 108.
71. See Dombrowski v. Pflster, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
73. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Baggett v.
Bullett, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252
(1957).
74. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539
(1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See generally Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 I1uv. L.
Rv. 1130 (1972); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLum. L. Rav.
808 (1969).
75. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
76. See Note, supranote 74.
77. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
78. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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by vagueness, overbreadth, and unbridled discretion to limit their
exercise."

7 9

Nevertheless, in Laird v. Tatum"0 the Court held, in a 54 decision,81 that no justiciable controversy was presented by a claim that
the mere existence of an intelligence gathering and distributing system created an unconstitutional chilling effect, where the plaintiffs
were not the specific targets of governmental action. At issue was a
nationwide intelligence plan adopted by the Army in response to civil
disorders in Detroit during the summer of 1967. Information about
'
persons "thought to have at least some potential for civil disorder"82
was gathered principally from the news media and generally circulated
publications, but reports submitted by Army agents who attended
public meetings and from civilian law enforcement agencies were
utilized as well. The information was distributed to Army posts around
the country and stored in computer data banks.
The Court reasoned that in none of the previous cases in which
unconstitutional chilling effects were found
did the chilling effect arise merely from the individual's knowledge
that a government agency was engaged in certain activities or from
the individual's concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of
those activities, the agency might in the future take some other and
additional action detrimental to that individual. Rather, in each of
these cases, the challenged exercise of government power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant
regulations, prowas either presently or prospectively subject to the
83
scriptions, or compulsions that he was challenging.
In his dissenting opinion, 4 Justice Douglas disagreed with the conclusion that a chilling effect can be shown only when the governmental
power is regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory. Quoting from Justice
Brennan's concurrence in Lamont v. Postmaster Generalrs he insisted
that the proper test should be whether there is a significant present in79. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 345 (1967)
senting).

(Brennan, J., dis-

80. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
81. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
White, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist joined. Dissenting opinions were either written or joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and Marshall.
82. 408 U.S. at 6.
83. Id. at 11.
84. Id. at 16.
85. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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hibitory effect"6 : " 'inhibition as well as prohibition against the exercise
of precious First Amendment rights is a power denied to government.' "'87 Applying this test to the allegations, Douglas concluded that
the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Army surveillance program
on first amendment grounds. His determination was based on the following factors: (1) The surveillance was "not casual" but was "massive
and comprehensive." (2) The agents' reports were routinely and widely
circulated, and were exchanged with local police departments, the
FBI, and the CIA. (3)The surveillance went beyond merely collecting information from already public records. It included "staking out
teams of agents, infiltrating undercover agents, creating command posts
inside meetings, posing as press photographers and newsmen, posing as
TV newsmen, posing as students, and shadowing public figures." (4)
There was evidence of past misuse and abuse by the Army of its intelligence system."8
Whatever the merits of the Laird majority's formulation of the
appropriate first amendment test, it is important to note what was not
decided in that case. First, the Court refrained from ruling on the
question of the propriety or desirability of the type of surveillance
at issue in Laird, holding only that its challengers there did not allege
sufficient injury to raise a justiciable controversy. In fact, the Court
cautioned, in dicta, that it found military intrusion into civilian affairs
generally abhorrent, and that should a case which satisfied the majority's test of a chilling effect be presented, it would seek to provide
an appropriate remedy. 9
Second, and most significant here, the majority, unlike Justice
Douglas, did not view this case as one involving the use of a secret
agent. Quoting from the opinion of the court below, the Court found
"... no evidence of illegal or unlawful surveillance activities. We
are not cited to any clandestine intrusion by a military agent. So
far as is yet shown, the information gathered is nothing more than

a good newspaper reporter would be able to gather by attendance
at public meetings and the clipping of articles from publications
available on any newsstand." 90
86. 408 U.S. at 25. This was the position of the court of appeals in deciding
the case. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
87. 408 U.S. at 26-27 (quoting 381 U.S. 301, 309 (1965) (Brennan, J., con-

curring)).
88. 408 U.S. at 26-27 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 15.
90. Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting 444 F.2d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
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Third, the Court did not foreclose the possibility of legislative
action designed to limit domestic surveillance and protect related first
amendment interests. Rather, it expressly invited Congress to do so.0 1
B. Informants and the ChillingEffect in the Aftermath of Laird
The courts, in interpreting Laird, generally have predicated their
threshold determinations of the existence of a justiciable controversy
on (1)the severity and immediacy of the injury alleged; (2) the degree
to which the surveillance is a surreptitious invasion of private activity
(as opposed to mere observation of activity already exposed to the
public at large); and (3) the extent and nature of any abusive conduct on the part of undercover agents.
In Handschu v. Special Services Division,9 2 a federal district court
refused to dismiss a claim of a first amendment violation stemming
from the use of informants and infiltrators by the New York Police
Department. Although conceding, in accordance with Laird, that the
mere existence of the surveillance system of the Special Services Division was not in and of itself unconstitutional, the court found that the
complaint presented a justiciable controversy. In Handschu, plaintiffs alleged that agents provoked, solicited, and induced members of
political groups to engage in unlawful activities, provided funds and
equipment for that purpose, compiled lists of attendance at group
meetings in order to assemble dossiers on individual members, and
attempted in other ways to disrupt lawful political activity by inciting
intragroup mistrust and suspicion. It was further alleged that an
antiwar veterans group already had disbanded as a result of the disruption caused by the informants. These claims, if proven, were held
to be sufficient for a finding of a chilling of constitutionally protected
political expression. 93
91. 408 U.S. at 15.
92. 349 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
93. Compare Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974) (no justiciable controversy where chilling
effect claimed to stem from covert activities including examination of the spccial bank
account of an antiwar demonstration's organizer, ascertainment of the number of buses
obtained to transport demonstrators from New York to Washington, and observation
of the actual bus departures); Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of
Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1975) (no judicially cognizable chilling effect
where surveillance activities were limited to police photographing and gathering data
at public meetings); Donahue v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972) (no judicially
cognizable chilling effect where uniformed police photographed those present at a publie demonstration).
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In Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General,94 it was alleged
that members of the party's youth organization, the Young Socialist
Alliance (YSA), would be dissuaded from full participation and attendance in their annual convention because it was well known that the
FBI intended to infiltrate it, and because of a risk that the FBI would
maintain a file on those in attendance, which could be used against
them if they sought public employment. Justice Marshall, sitting
as circuit justice, found that the complaint alleged a sufficiently specific,
concrete injury to form a justiciable controversy, distinguishing Laird.9 5
On the merits, however, petitioners' request for relief in the form of a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the FBI from infiltrating the meeting was denied. Nevertheless, petitioners ultimately prevailed on the
question of whether the FBI would be able to forward names to the
Civil Service Commission or other agencies. 96
Socialist Workers Party highlights one specific type of injury
toward which the courts might be especially sympathetic when applying the Laird test to the infiltration of a group or organization-an
interference with the first amendment freedom of association:
[T]here is a valid First Amendment claim presented when a governmental authority seeks to obtain information about the identities
of the members of organizations . . . [where] the organizations have
standing to protect their members from unwarranted invasions by the
government of rights to association and privacy. 97
That government surveillance can inhibit freedom of association was
first established in Local 309, United Furniture Workers of America
v. Gates,98 where a first amendment violation was found in police
presence and note-taking at labor union meetings. This was relevant
in Socialist Workers Party, where the possibility of disclosure to gov94. 419 U.S. 1314 (1974).
95. Id. at 1318.
96. The district court had granted a preliminary injunction that prohibited the
actual infiltration. 387 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The order was vacated in part
by the court of appeals. 510 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam). The part retained
enjoined the FBI from forwarding names to the Civil Service Commission or other
agencies. The court of appeals decision was upheld by Justice Marshall. 419 U.S. 1314
(1974). Recently, the long-standing investigation of the Socialist Workers Party by the
FBI was terminated by Attorney General Levi. New York Times, Sept. 15, 1976, at

15, col. 1.

97. 387 F. Supp. at 751. See also Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
98. 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1948). See also Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d
594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (government electronic surveillance of Jewish Defense League
activities found to inhibit protected association).
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ernment agencies of the names of those attending a convention was
held to have a profound chilling effect on the right to associate with
a lawful political organization. 9
One difficult problem posed by claims based on an interest in
maintaining the privacy of one's associational activity is the possibility
that the more active and public the role one takes in advocating the
organization's causes, the weaker one's claim to first amendment protection may become. As noted in Laird,100 first amendment considerations do not require police agents to ignore information which has
been exposed widely and is available to the general public. In Socialist
Workers Party, the district court confronted this problem by categorizing the YSA convention as "semi-public"'' 1 and found that those in
attendance manifested a sufficient desire to maintain the privacy of
their associations to claim an abridgement of their first amendment
rights. 10 2 The court of appeals disagreed, finding that public reporting
of the event by the news media, which was to be allowed by the YSA,
constituted at least as significant a chilling effect as the presence of
FBI informants. 03 Thus, it appears that associational activities must
be private to some degree in order to constitute the basis for a valid
claim of chilling effect104
Rights of association also played a significant role in People v.
Collier.0 5 Noting that "rhetoric often exceeds intent" at a political
99. 387 F. Supp. at 751.
100. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
101. The court found that:
Although the meetings contemplated have various degrees of public or private
characteristics . . .basically the intention is to have only persons coming to
participate in the meetings as interested observers or participants, and it would
appear that if someone attempted to attend any of these meetings and was
considered undesirable by the YSA or the SWP, those organizations would have
the right to refuse admission to such unwanted persons.
387 F. Supp. at 749.
102.
I do not believe that a person who attends a meeting such as the one we are
talking about inevitably waives his right to have his attendance a more or
less private matter and not subject to Government surveillance. If he goes beyond this and manages to get his picture and name published in the party
paper or something like that, this would be a different matter, but we are not
talking about that kind of people. We are talking about the rank and file of
the young people who apparently wish to attend this type of meeting with
something less than that much notoriety.
Id. at 751.
103. 510 F.2d at 257.
104. See Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1130, 1277 (1972).

105. 85 Misc. 2d 529, 376 N.Y.S.2d 954 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975). For a
discussion of the facts of this case, see text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
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meeting of a controversial nature, the court reasoned that "many persons may hesitate to attend" such meetings "if their attendance and
comments will be reported and permanently recorded in a police
dossier."'01 6 Thus, an "unrestrained surveillance operation calculated
to stifle the willingness of people to exercise those preferred freedoms
of speech, association and assembly" was held to violate the first amendment.10 7 Since one basic purpose of infiltration of a group or organization is to acquire membership lists,08 the holding in Collier suggests
that courts might bring much covert intelligence gathering within the
proscriptions of the first amendment. 0 9
There also is some indication that infiltration of groups held in
disfavor by those controlling the apparatus of government surveillance
sometimes not only has the effect of inhibiting first amendment freedoms but is intended to do so. Dissident organizations have been made
targets of intelligence operations in order to ."enhance the paranoia
endemic in these circles and [to] further serve to get the point across
[that] there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox.""10 Justice Douglas
has commented that: "More than our privacy is implicated. Also at
stake is the reach of the Government's power to intimidate its critics.""'
Paranoia and intimidation may not be the only intended results. Continuing government investigation of this kind may also result in the
2
official stigmatization of dissident groups."
An intelligence investigation need not, however, focus on a specific
organization or individual in order to chill first amendment rights. In
106. Id. at 558, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
107. Id. at 560, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
108. See Senate Hearings at 261 (testimony of Norman Dorsen, New York University Professor of Law, Dec. 9, 1975).
109. "It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with
groups engaged in advocacy may constitute [an] effective restraint on freedom of association." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
110. New York Times, Mar. 25, 1971, at 33, col. 1, quoted in United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 331, n.10 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Handschu v. Special Services Division, 349 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) ; Greenwalt, supra note 69.
111. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 331 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
112.
When the official investigation long outlives its initially professed justification
-that is to say, reasoned suspicion of criminal activity imminent or actually
carried out-at that point it is inescapable... that an important consequence,
if not necessarily a purpose, of the continuing investigation will be the imposition of an official stigma on the political or research activity being carried out
by the "subject."
HousE COMMITTEE REPoRT in Village Voice at 91, col. 3, n.534.
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White v. Davis,113 a recent California case, police agents posed as university students and covertly recorded class discussions, reported on
public and private meetings of various campus organizations, and filed
dossiers and intelligence reports on students and professors. It was
alleged that the investigation was unrelated to any specific criminal
activity. The court deemed the alleged injury sufficient to present a
cognizable claim, finding "a substantial probability that [the] alleged
covert police surveillance will chill the exercise of First Amendment
rights." 114
These cases illustrate that the relationship between the first amendment and the use of undercover agents and informants to gather information is somewhat flexible. On the one hand, the Court has thus
far refused to find standing to challenge governmental surveillance
on first amendment grounds where the only injury alleged is the mere
existence of a surveillance system. On the other hand, it has yet to
decide a case in this area where it has found a cognizable claim of a
chilling effect. The first amendment, therefore, has not been rejected
113. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975). In White, which
was brought under California law as a taxpayer action, plaintiff, a university professor,
sought to enjoin the expenditure of public funds for on-campus intelligence activities.
Cf. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
114. 13 Cal. 3d at 761, 533 P.2d at 224, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 96. In an analysis
of the first amendment injury which is useful for purposes of the discussion, the court
in White reasoned as follows:
(1) The courts have never given blanket approval for all undercover surveillance.
Where no specific criminal activity is alleged as justification for surveillance that may
infringe on first amendment rights, closer judicial regulation is called for. The fact
that the police have a legitimate interest in preventing future criminal activity does
not mean that government officials may exercise totally unbridled authority to conduct
undercover surveillance.
(2) Ongoing police surveillance of a university community may inhibit the first
amendment freedom of association, through the gathering of political ideas and affiliations of individuals who could not constitutionally be compelled to disclose them, as
well as through the infiltration of university-sponsored organizations.
(3) The free expression of ideas in a university classroom may be chilled by such
surveillance. The content of classroom activity should receive special protection from
governmental intrusion. Id. at 765-69.
Having thus established a substantial chilling effect, the court remanded the case
in order to provide the police with an opportunity to demonstrate that the surveillance
was justified by a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 761.
The two-step analysis of White-first, the finding of a substantial inhibitory effect,
and second, an analysis of the relevant governmental interest and a determination of
whether it outweighs the constitutional violation-had been used in two notable preLaird cases dealing with police surveillance and the first amendment. See Bee See
Books Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (unconstitutional chilling effect
where uniformed policemen stationed in plaintiffs book store in order to discourage
sales of pornographic literature); Local 309, Furniture Workers v. Gates, 75 F. Supp.
620 (N.D. Ind. 1948).
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as a major protection against the use of informants by the government,
and in at least one case, Laird, the Court has indicated that in an appropriate case first amendment interests would be protected. Despite
the lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court since Laird, some
state and lower federal courts have begun to carve out standards for determining the constitutionality of specific forms of intelligence gathering. In so doing, they have made it increasingly clear that where surveillance is found to abridge first amendment rights, only a compelling
governmental interest will suffice as a justification." 5 Presumably, such
an interest must be related to recognized functions of law enforcement, for example, the investigation or prevention of specific criminal
activity. There is no compelling, or even legitimate, governmental
interest in the indiscriminante gathering of data about the private or
political lives of individuals or groups not suspected of specific criminal
activity. The risks inherent in wholesale and unrestricted intelligence
gathering cannot be taken lightly:
We cannot live in a free society where we have a sense of being
observed by government watchers.
Unwarranted police surveillance will destroy our capacity to tolerate-and even encourage---dissent and nonconformity; it promotes
a climate of fear; it intimidates, demoralizes, and frightens the community into silence.... A ubiquitous secret police and an obsequious
society go hand in hand."16
The relevant inquiry is then: What is the best method of restricting
the official use of informants, infiltrators, and other undercover police
agents to investigating or preventing only specific criminal activities?

IV.

CONTROLLING THE GOVERNMENT'S USE OF INFORMANTS
THROUGH PRIOR JUDICIAL REvIEw

A. The Need for PriorJudicialReview
The most appropriate and effective method of controlling the use
of informants would be a requirement that a judicial warrant precede
the commencement of any covert intelligence gathering. The warrant
115. See Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 387 F. Supp. 747, 752
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); People v. Collier, .85 Misc. 2d 529, 560, 376 N.Y.S.2d 954, 985
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 761, 533 P.2d 222,
224, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 96 (1975).
116. 85 Misc. 2d at 554, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
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would issue upon a finding that the use of a secret agent is necessary
in connection with the prevention or investigation of specific, articulable criminal activity.
The requirement of prior judicial review traditionally has served
as the major safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited by the fourth amendment. 117 The rationale underlying the
fourth amendment warrant provision is that executive officers responsible for law enforcement, investigation, or prosecution "should not
be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means
in pursuing their tasks.""" Well-intentioned efforts on the part of
executive officers may lead to overzealous attempts to gather evidence
which overlook constitutional values.11 Therefore,
the very heart of the Fourth Amendment directive [is] that, where
practical, a governmental search and seizure should represent both
the efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the
judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient
to justify invasion of a citizen's private premises or conversation. Inherent in the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a "neutral and
detached magistrate." . . . The further requirement of "probable
cause" instructs the magistrate that baseless searches shall not proceed. 2 0
Prior judicial review, however, has been held to be of significant
value not only in safeguarding fourth amendment rights, but also in
protecting the free and uninhibited expression guaranteed by the first
amendment.'21 In a good-faith but overzealous effort to enforce the
law, law enforcement officials might overlook potential invasions not
only of privacy, but of protected speech as well. 22 Moreover, a convergence of first and fourth amendment values is not uncommon. 28
This is particularly true in cases where "national security" is the sole
117. "The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affrmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
118. 407 U.S. at 317.
119. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).
120. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972).
121. See, e.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
122. 407 U.S. at 317.
123. See id. at 313-14; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); Zweibon
v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Note, Police Undercover Agents:
New Threat to First Amendment Freedoms, 37 Gro. WASH. L. RaV. 634 (1969);
Note, Alternative Approaches for Resolving Associated First and Fourth Amendment
Issues, 44 TamP. L.Q. 420 (1971).
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justification for a police investigation. In such cases, there is a "greater
jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech ....
History abundantly
documents the tendency of Government-however benevolent and
benign its motives-to view with suspicion those who most fervently
1 24
dispute its policies.
Recognizing the particular dangers to first amendment freedoms
that may be engendered by the use of informants, the House Select
Committee has recommended to the full House of Representatives that
judicial warrants must issue, on probable cause, before an informant
or any other agent of the FBI may infiltrate any domestic group or
association, when investigation of such group or association or its
members is based solely on Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 2283, 2384, 2385.125

It is difficult to evaluate fully the Committee proposal at this time
because of the suppression of the House report. 2 6 Nevertheless, the
recommendation is significant and laudable as an attempt to persuade
the Congress, based on the extensive testimony which the Committee
received, that prior judicial review is necessary to control the use of
informants by the FBI.J27
There are many advantages to the use of prior judicial review in
this context. For example, an impartial magistrate can determine
whether there is a "substantial relationship between the information
sought and some compelling governmental interest"'128 which justifies
intrusion on first amendment freedoms. Furthermore, if the informant
may be used only where the magistrate is convinced that specific criminal activity is involved, there would be significantly less chance of infringing the first amendment freedoms of those engaged in lawful
124. 407 U.S. at 313-14.
125. Recommendations of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Recommendation "T (1)," issued February 1976 (emphasis added). Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 2283,
2384 and 2385 deal with rebellion or insurrection, seditious conspiracy and advocating
the overthrow of the government, respectively.
126. See note 46 supra.

127. The Senate Committee has also received testimony that a warrant based on
probable cause should be required as a precondition to the use of an informant for
official intelligence gathering. Senate Hearings at 262-66 (testimony of Norman Dorsen,
New York University Professor of Law, Dec. 9, 1975); see id. at 221 (testimony of
Ramsay Clark, former U.S. Attorney General, Dec. 3, 1975). The former Attorney
General maintained in his testimony that the use of paid informants, which he found
to be "inimical to freedom," should be so stringently regulated that "the standards
should exceed those that the courts have now imposed upon Fourth Amendment procedure regarding search and seizure." Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
128. 85 Misc. 2d at 560, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 984. See also note 115 supra & accompanying text.
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political, social, or community activities. Wholesale, unrestricted
gathering of unnecessary information would decrease, while bona fide
attempts to investigate or prevent crime through the use of informants
could continue. Since "[i]t is difficult to conceive how surveillance
and infiltration of persons and associations engaged in lawful ...

ac-

tivity bear any relationship to the important mission of the police to
control crime,'

29

there is no apparent reason why the legitimate per-

formance of law enforcement duties would be impaired.
Prior judicial review also would limit surveillance so that it would
be no more intrusive than necessary under the circumstances. The
magistrate could restrict the informant's activities, the number of
people about whom information may be gathered, and the duration
of the surveillance. 130 Absent this kind of review, it is extremely
difficult to fix responsibility for an informant's actions, since his instructions are usually provided orally with no witnesses. 181 If prior
judicial review were required, the limitations imposed on the informant would be recorded. Perhaps most important in the first
amendment context, the public might be reassured that indiscriminate
spying on innocent citizens would decrease. 3 2
Post hoc review does not serve these interests adequately. For
those who may eventually be accused of a crime, the absence of prior
judicial review means that there is no record available indicating
whether the informant's actions were initially justified. More important, since domestic intelligence gathering often does not lead to arrest
and prosecution, post hoc review offers no protection in the vast majority of cases.
It should be emphasized that to say that informants will not be
utilized without prior judicial approval is not to say that the use of
informants will be abolished. First, the warrant requirement should
129. 85 Misc. 2d at 560, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
130. The scope of an FBI informant's activities is virtually unlimited under the
FBI's manual of instructions for informants. There is no requirement that information
gathering be limited to that which relates to commission of criminal offenses or violent
activity. An FBI official characterized an informant as a"vacuum cleaner" of information and confessed that "too much information" is generally produced. SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT at 229. A study by the General Accounting Office concurs in this assessment COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, FBI DOMEsTIc INTELLIGENCE OPERATION-THEIR
PURPOSE AND SCOPE: ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE RESOLVED 151 (Feb. 24, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT].

131. HousE COMMITTEE REPORT in Village Voice at 91, col. 1.
132. See 407 U.S. at 321.

1976-77]

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE INFORMANTS

199

be limited to those situations in which there is a legitimate interest

in the privacy of the conversation or activity.133 Public surveillance
would therefore not be affected, 134 and the plain view doctrine would

continue to be applicable. 13

Second, when the required prior judicial

approval can be obtained, the surreptitious use of informants would
still be available. Third, some of the same exigent circumstances which

have been recognized as exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant
requirement could be made applicable here.13

Where there is a

danger of the destruction of evidence 137 or to the safety of an individual and the obtaining of a warrant thereby has been made im-

practical, the informant could be utilized without prior judicial approval. The circumstances under which this exception would apply,
however, should be narrowly and specifically delineated. Moreover,
the strong preference for warrants that exists under the fourth amendment also should exist here, since in the overwhelming majority of

domestic intelligence cases exigent circumstances probably do not
88

exist.3
Despite its many advantages, prior judicial review has never been
judicially or legislatively mandated as a prerequisite for the use of
informants. At present, the determination of when and how to utilize
an informant is a matter solely within the discretion of law enforcement
officials. 139 The standards which have been applied voluntarily are
133. See notes 98-109 supra & accompanying text.
134. One commentator has suggested a separate standard for public surveillance,
which would not require judicial review:
[Public surveillance should be limited] to those situations in which the Government reasonably suspects that the individual or individuals under surveillance have committed or are likely to engage in criminal activity, or in which
there is a reasonable possibility that violence is likely to occur even if it is
impossible to specify in advance which individual or individuals are likely to
commit acts of violence.
Christie, Government Surveillance and Individual Freedom: A Proposed Statutory Response to Laird v. Tatum and the Broader Problem of Government Surveillance of the
Individual, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 871, 888 (1972).
135. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-71 (1971).
136. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
137. Obviously, this would not apply to simply any spoken word; to do so would
allow the police constantly to claim the existence of this exigent circumstance. Furthermore, where the possible destruction of evidence could have been prevented but
for unreasonable delay on the part of the police, the "exigent circumstance" exception
should not be available.
138. See Bergstrom, The Applicability of the "New" Fourth Amendment to Investigations by Secret Agents: A Proposed Delineation of the Emerging Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 45 WAsm. L. Rsv. 785, 813-14 (1970).
139. Under the new Justice Department guidelines, see notes 142-46 infra & accompanying text, the FBI would retain this discretion. Preliminary and limited in-
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invariably less stringent than that of probable cause, and frequently
ambiguous or nonexistent. At the Senate Hearings, an FBI official
testified that the applicable standard has been "something less than
probable cause of a crime, [but] more than mere suspicion."' 40 The
Senate Committee found that the FBI manual of instructions for informants, which up to now has been the principal document governing
the use of this investigative technique,
does not set independent standards which must be supported by facts
before an organization can be the subject of informant coverage.
Once the criteria for opening a regular intelligence investigation are
met, and the case is opened, informants can be used without any
restrictions. There is no specific determination made as to whether
the substantial intrusion represented by informant coverage is justified
by the government's interest in obtaining information. There is
nothing that requires that a determination be made of whether less
intrusive means will adequately serve the government's interest. There
is also no requirement that the decisions of FBI officials to use informants be reviewed by anyone outside the Bureau. In short, intelligence informant coverage has not been subject to the standards
which govern the use of other intrusive techniques such as wire,
141
tapping or other forms of electronic surveillance.
These shortcomings have not been adequately rdmedied by the lately
promulgated Justice Department guidelines for domestic intelligence
issued by Attorney General Levi in January 1976. Some attempt has
been made to impose greater restrictions on the implementation of a
"full" investigation, which under the guidelines may not be commenced
except "on the basis of specific and articulable facts giving reason to
vestigations may be initiated by FBI field offices and full investigations by FBI headquarters. Proposed Guidelines, Domestic Security Investigations, United States Department of Justice, January 6, 1976 [hereinafter cited as Proposed Guidelines]. Some police
departments require that the determination be made by specified upper-echelon law
enforcement officers. Guidelines promulgated in New York City in 1973 require that
all intelligence investigations unrelated to organized crime be approved by the Police
Commissioner, the First Deputy Police Commissioner, the Chief of Inspectional Services,
or the commanding officer of the intelligence division. New York Times, Feb. 9, 1973,
at 70, col. 2. Often, however, the determination is made at lower levels of the law enforcement agency. See People v. Collier, 85 Misc. 2d 529, 537-38, 376 N.Y.S.2d 954,
964-65 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975) (requirement of upper-level approval ignored);
Developments in the Law, supra note 74, at 1280-81.
140. House ComMITTEE REPORT in Village Voice at 90, col. 3. Moreover, prior

to the issuance of Attorney General Levi's guidelines, FBI standards for the use of
domestic intelligence informants were not available to the public. SENATE COMMITTEE
RE'ORT at 229.
141. SENATE COmmITTEE REPORT at 229.
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believe that an individual or a group is or may be engaged in activities
which involve or will involve the violation of federal law," and
which are intended to further one or more of several enumerated purposes.142 In addition, the guidelines require a balancing of the intrusion on rights of privacy and free expression with "the magnitude of
the threatened harm; the likelihood it will occur; [and] the immediacy
of the threat." 143 However, in 1974, 90 per cent of the domestic intelligence cases opened by the FBI were not classified as "full" inTo initiate a prevestigations, but as "preliminary" investigations. 1'
liminary investigation, the guidelines require only "allegationsor other
information that an individual or a group may be engaged in activities
142. Proposed Guidelines at II(1). The enumerated purposes are:
(1) overthrowing the government of the United States or the government of a
State;
(2) substantially interfering, in the United States, with the activities of a foreign
government or its authorized representatives;
(3) substantially impairing for the purpose of influencing U.S. government policies
or decisions:
(a) the functioning of the government of the United States;
(b) the functioning of the government of a State; or
(c) interstate commerce;
(4) depriving persons of their civil rights under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.
Id. at I(A). Local guidelines have also been undergoing some reform. Proposed guidelines for the Los Angeles Police Department would permit the initiation or maintenance
of an intelligence file on organizations or individuals who "threaten, attempt, plan, or
perform acts disruptive of the public order." In addition, "[fliles may be maintained
with respect to organizations that possess or attempt to acquire quantities of arms, ammunition or explosives for the purpose of disruption of the public order." Files may
also be maintained under the guidelines "with respect to organizations" classified above,
and on individuals "who are officers of, who officially act for, or who determine or
execute the policies" of those organizations. The Los Angeles Police Department Public Disorder Intelligence Division, Standards and Procedures, Draft (Oct. 27, 1975).
143. Proposed Guidelines at II(I).
GAO REPORT at 112. Under the guidelines, domestic intelligence investigadivided into three categories: preliminary investigations, limited investigations
investigations. Preliminary investigations include:
examination of FBI indices and files;
examination of public records and other public sources of information;
examination of federal, state, and local records;
inquiry of existing sources of information and use of previously established informants; and
(5) physical surveillance and interviews of persons not mentioned in [1-4] for the
limited purpose of identifying the subject of an investigation.
Proposed Guidelines at II(E) (emphasis added). Limited investigations include those
techniques listed above under preliminary investigations plus physical surveillance and
interviews "for purposes other than identifying the subject under investigation." Id. at
II(F). A full investigation can involve a full array of investigative techniques, including the recruiting and placing of new informants as well as the use of mail covers and
electronic surveillance. Id. at II(G).
144.
tions are
and full
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
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[for at least one of the enumerated purposes] which involve or will
involve the use of force and violence and which involve or will involve
the violation of federal law. . . ,*'14 Moreover, the determination of
when to initiate an investigation and make use of an informant remains in the hands of the FBI.146 In assessing the past performance
of the Bureau's field offices in initiating preliminary investigations, the
General Accounting Office found that they did not distinguish adequately between preliminary and full investigations, did not limit
properly the scope of preliminary investigations, and commenced pre147
liminary investigations on the basis of "weak or minimal evidence."'
The guidelines fail to provide for any congressional or judicial oversight to ensure the rectification of this situation.
B. The Arguments Against PriorJudicial Review and Some Responses
Several arguments have been advanced in support of the broad
discretion exercised by the executive branch and in opposition to a
requirement of prior judicial approval for the use of informants. Some
of those most frequently mentioned follow.
1. Domestic intelligence gathering activities are generally anticipatory or preventive in nature. They are, therefore, "broader than
investigationsstrictly designed to collect evidence for criminal proceedings . . . [and] requir[e] continuing investigative activity in cases
wherein criminal conduct remains a future possibility. ' 148 A requirement of prior judicial approval based on probable cause would be impractical under these circumstances. 49 The duties of the police un145. Proposed Guidelines II(C) (emphasis added). See note 142 supra.
146. The guidelines do provide for annual review by the Justice Department of
full investigations. Proposed Guidelines at III(C). Thus, ultimate responsibility remains
within the executive branch. While there is no apparent reason to believe that this
responsibility will not be carried out in good faith, even the highest-ranking officials
within the Justice Department are not immune from overzealousness in enforcing the
law, as was amply demonstrated by the revelations of Watergate.
147. GAO REPORT at 111-12.
148. HousE COmMITTE

REPORT

in Village Voice at 90, col. 3.

149. At the Senate Hearings, James Adams, Assistant to the Director, elaborated
further on the FBI's position:
In the intelligence field we are not dealing necessarily with an imminent criminal action. We're dealing with activities such as with the Socialist Workers
Party . . . where they say publicly we're not to engage in any violent activity
today, but we guarantee you we still subscribe to the tenets of communism and
that when the time is ripe, we're going to rise up and help overthrow the
United States.
. . . You can't show probable cause if they're about to do it because
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doubtedly include the prevention as well as the investigation of crime.
However, vague justifications such as "national security," "subversiveness," or "strategic intelligence gathering" should not be enough, in
and of themselves, to trigger an investigation which inhibits open and
free expression and association, and which invades the confines of
private, personal relationships. Unless a law enforcement agency can
demonstrate to a neutral, detached magistrate that an informant is
needed to help prevent violations of the criminal law, no compelling
governmental interest that outweighs the inhibition of first amendment interests is served.
The fact that most intelligence operations are anticipatory does
not render the standard of probable cause untenable. Law enforcement agencies need not be required to show that a crime has been
committed. Probable cause to believe that specific criminal activity
is about to occur and a showing that alternative, less intrusive methods
of investigation would be ineffective or dangerous would suffice. 5 0
Nevertheless, in formulating new controls over the use of informants, Congress or the courts may wish to distinguish undercover investigations of ordinary street crime from domestic intelligence investigations, to the extent of requiring something less than probable
cause' 5 ' as the standard applicable to the latter.15 2 The precise level
to which proof of the connection between the requested investigatory
methods and specific criminal activity must rise is not the crucial
factor. The key advantages of prior judicial review-independent
oversight, restrictions on the nature and duration of the investigation,
they're telling you they're not going to do it and you know they're not going
to do it at this particular moment.
Senate Hearings at 140-41 (Dec. 2, 1975).
150. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970) (probable cause requirement for electronic surveillance).
151. An exact definition of the standard of "probable cause" has proved to be
elusive. However, probable cause to search is generally considered to mean "a substantial probability that the invasions involved in the search will be justified by the
discovery of offending items." Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court:
Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CH. L. Rv. 664, 687 (1961). See also

N.Y. CRim.

PRo. LAW

§ 690.35 (McKinney 1971). Probable cause to arrest exists when

"'the facts and circumstances within [the government's] knowledge, and of which [it]
had reasonably trustworthy information, [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed."
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).

152. The Supreme Court has indicated that this lesser standard may be appro-

priate in cases affecting the national security. United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972).
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the establishment and preservation of a record, and the adducement
of evidence demonstrating some measure of a substantial connection
with criminal activity-remain intact whether the standard is termed
"probable cause," "reasonable cause," or something else. What is
important is the need to establish, before an informant is utilized, that
he is needed for purposes of a legitimate governmental objective, that
no less intrusive means will accomplish that objective, and that this
can be demonstrated convincingly to someone outside the agency,
preferably to a disinterested magistrate.
2. The judicial process is not equipped to evaluate the sensitive
national security interests which may be at stake.11 3 This contention
was succinctly answered by the Supreme Court in United States v.
United States District Court,1 54 where the Court held that a warrant
must be obtained for domestic national security wiretaps: "If the threat
is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers to convey its significance to a court, one may question whether there is
probable cause for surveillance."' 55
3. Where national security interests are involved, judicial process
entails too much danger of a security leak.15 6 This argument overlooks
the fact that judges are constantly required to maintain the confidentiality of day-to-day criminal investigations. There is no reason to
believe that they could not do the same with respect to national security information. The warrant proceeding is ex parte and only
the magistrate need be present. If clerical assistance is required, the
government, if it feels the need, can supply its own. In addition, post
hoc review in the context of a lawsuit may present greater danger of
leakage. Where prior judicial review is required, only facts sufficient
to establish an appropriate connection with criminal activity need be
divulged; disclosing every item of vital security information at the
157
disposal of the government would not be necessary.
4. The delay inherent in the warrant proceeding will lead to the
loss of essential information. 58 This contention fails to consider the
availability of the "exigent circumstance" exception to the warrant
requirement. Even without this exception, however, there is no reason
153. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

154. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 320.
See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Id. at 641.
Id.
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to believe that the relatively brief time required to secure a warrant
would inordinately delay the typical intelligence operation, which
usually involves strategic planning rather than on-the-street confrontations.159
5. Resort to a system of prior judicial approval would place too
great an administrative burden on the courts. 60 Where constitutional
rights are threatened, judicial expediency should not stand as an obstacle to needed safeguards. Moreover, the apparatus required for a
warrant proceeding is not exceedingly intricate, and courts do not
appear to be incapable of handling the present volume of applications
for warrants. In addition, a byproduct of the imposition of a warrant
requirement might be to discourage unjustified attempts to utilize informants, thus decreasing any additional workload which the courts
might have to take on.
6. A judicially enforced standard for the use of informants is impractical because of a lack of effective remedies when the standard is
violated.'0' To the contrary, a wide range of remedies would be available. Post hoc suits for damages or injunctive relief that present justiciable controversies would continue to exist. Furthermore, an exclusionary rule could be applied in those cases where evidence gathered
by an informant acting without prior judicial approval is used for a
criminal prosecution. Statutes might also prescribe civil or criminal
62
penalties for violations.
It should be noted, however, that an important part of the rationale underlying a requirement of prior judicial review is that law
enforcement agencies will attempt to comply, thereby reducing the
number of obtrusive, unnecessary, and unconstitutional domestic intelligence operations. The fact that some undetected or irremediable
violations of the warrant requirement would exist does not subvert
this goal.
7. Although no uniform articulated standard is currently applied
by law enforcement agencies, ideological biases have never been sufficient justificationfor an intelligence investigation. The FBI enunciated
this position at the hearings before the House Committee.'6 It is a view
159.
160.
note 134,
161.
162.
163.

See Bergstrom, supra note 138, at 813.
See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Christie, supra
at 888.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 74, at 1281.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970).
HousE COMmrrTEE REPORT in Village Voice at 90, col. 3.
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officially shared by the New York' 4 and Los Angeles'('- police departments. Unfortunately, such claims find little historical support, especially with respect to the FBI. For example, the House Committee
found that the mere writing of a letter by a high school student to the
Socialist Workers Party was enough to trigger an "anticipatory" intelligence investigation, although there was no evidence of any sort of
criminal or violent behavior.166 Law enforcement officials frequently
tend to single out for investigation those groups that are held in official
disfavor, without regard to whether the investigation will further compelling governmental interests. 1 7 Even if political motivations had not
historically played such a prominent role, there would be no convincing reason for restricting solely to executive discretion the determination of when and how to utilize an informant. If law enforcement
agencies have evidence warranting something more than mere suspicion, it is difficult to see why such evidence could not be evaluated
properly by a magistrate.
The concept of prior judicial approval does pose other problems. First, there is the possibility that simple logistics will require
pro forma approval, thus legitimating surveillance activity that might
otherwise be subject to challenge. 168 Second, there is always the danger
that charges of criminal behavior and statements of affiants will be
falsified. Both problems could in part be remedied through the use of
suppression hearings, where the record could be examined to determine if the requisite showing had been made when the warrant was
issued. More important, there is no reason to believe that a warrant
164. See New York Times, Feb. 9, 1973, at 70, col. 2.
165. See Statement of the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners, The Public
Disorder Intelligence Function of the Los Angeles Police Department (Apr. 10, 1975).
166. Housp CoirrTEE REPORT in Village Voice at 90, col. 3.
167. See Greenwalt, supra note 69. For instance, the FBI's COINTELPRO "was
a series of covert counterintelligence programs aimed at identifying, penetrating, and
neutralizing subversive elements in the United States" which existed from approximately
1956 through 1971. This program was justified by the FBI on the ground "that it was
dictated by the mood of the times." As is pointed out by the House Committee:
The FBI, as implementors of the program, thereby become the barometer of
the country's mood, instead of fulfilling their statutory function of enforcing
Federal laws. Evidence received by the Committee of FBI racism, bias, and
strong conservative ideology hardly qualifies it to review people's politics.
Moreover, the Constitution prohibits such a role and protects the very things
the FBI was attempting to punish.
HousE COMMITTEE REPORT in Village Voice at 90, col. 3.
168. See Senate Hearings at 625 (testimony of Norman Dorsen, Dec. 9, 1975).
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requirement designed to safeguard first dmendment interests would
pose or encounter obstacles more formidable than those associated with
the fourth amendment's warrant requirement.
CONCLUSION

It is not likely that the federal courts will insist on prior judicial
review. In Hoffa, the Warren Court accepted the use of informants, and
in Laird, the present Court ruled that one who is the target of official
surveillance must show a high degree of injury before he may present
first amendment objections. The Burger Court has also steadily whittled
away the scope of the exclusionary rule. 69 While state courts are free
to go beyond the minimal constitutional protections recognized by the
Supreme Court, they rarely do so. 70 New controls over the government's use of informants therefore must emanate from the legislature.
Now that the Iouse Committee on Intelligence has recognized that
prior judicial approval is needed, it is hoped that the full House and
subsequently the Senate will enact appropriate legislation in the near
future.
Under prevailing legal theory, law enforcement agencies have virtually unlimited discretion in determining when, where, how, and
against whom informants may be used for the purposes of domestic
intelligence gathering. The fourth and fifth amendments to the Constitution have been rejected by the Supreme Court as limiting or qualifying the government's power to infiltrate. Any safeguards provided
by the sixth amendment attorney-client privilege, the defense of entrapment, the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and the supervisory powers of the federal courts are either inadequate or ineffective to prevent widespread official spying, with its
deleterious effect on constitutional rights. The chilling of first amendment freedoms caused by pervasive, unrestrained and frequently unprincipled official spying makes compelling the need for prior judicial
review of the government's use of informants. In Laird, Justice Douglas observed:
Those who already walk submissively will say there is no cause for
alarm. But submissiveness is not our heritage. The First Amendment
169. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
170. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
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was designed to allow rdbellion to remain as our heritage. The Constitution was designed to keep government off the backs of the people.
The Bill of Rights was added to keep the precincts of belief and expression, of the press, of political and social activities free from surveillance. The Bill of Rights was designed to keep agents of government and official eavesdroppers away from assemblies of people. The
aim was to allow men to be free and independent and to assert their
rights against government. There can be no influence more paralyzing
of that objective than Army surveillance. When an intelligence officer
looks over every noncomformist's shoulder in the library, or walks
invisibly by his side in a picket line, or infiltrates his club, the America once extolled as the voice of liberty around the world no longer
is cast in the image which Jefferson and Madison designed .... 171
MARTIN L. PERSCHETZ
171. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1972) (dissenting opinion).

